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Recent Decisions
Constitutional Law - Uniform Law To Secure Attend-
ance Of Witnesses Sustained. People of the State of New
York v. O'Neill, 79 S. Ct. 564 (1959). Plaintiff, a citizen of
Illinois, traveled to Florida to attend a convention. While
in Florida, plaintiff was served with a summons requiring
him to appear at a hearing held pursuant to the provisions
of Florida's "Uniform Law to Secure the Attendance of
Witnesses From Within or Without a State in Criminal
Proceedings" [F.S.A. § 942.01-942.06] to determine whether
plaintiff was to be given into the custody of New York
authorities and transported to New York to testify in a
grand jury proceeding in that state, in response to a request
from New York under the Act. Affirming the trial court
ruling refusing New York's request, the Supreme Court
of Florida held that the uniform act on its face violated
the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of Article IV, Sec-
tion 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Granting certiorari because of the constitu-
tional doubt thrown upon the Uniform Act (adopted in 42
states and Puerto Rico), the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the Act did not violate either provision.
Declining to express an opinion on whether or not the ab-
sence of any provision for bail in the Act constituted a
denial of due process, because this was not made a basis
for the decision below and was not clearly before the Court,
the majority opinion rejected the contention raised by the
dissenting opinions of Justices Douglas and Black that the
right of freedom of movement of a United States citizen
was violated by the statute and that the states could not
extradite witnesses without a specific grant of authority
to do so. They found the Act to be "within the unrestricted
area of action left to the States by the Constitution," and
that there had been no showing of discrimination within
the prohibition of the privileges and immunities clause, or
arbitrariness or unreasonableness to bring the condemna-
tion of due process.
As pointed out by the majority opinion, no witness
need be transported to the requesting state under the terms
of the statute unless the transporting state finds that "the
witness is material and necessary; that the trip to the re-
questing state would not involve hardship to the witness;
that the laws of the requesting State and States through
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which the witness must travel grant him immunity from
arrest and the service of civil and criminal process" [568].
In addition to these requirements the witness must receive
ten cents a mile to and from the requesting state and five
dollars a day for every day he is required to travel and
attend as a witness.
Maryland has adopted the Uniform Act with one notable
difference, i.e., the Maryland Act contains an additional
provision specifically admitting the witness to bail. 3 MD.
CODE (1957) Article 27, Sections 617-623, with Sections
618(c) and 619(a) admitting witnesses to bail. The Act
has not yet been construed in Maryland
Corporations - What Constitutes Doing Business.
Maclnnes v. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 257 F. 2d 832 (2nd
Cir., 1958). Defendant Florida hotel corporation maintained
an office in New York for the purpose of receiving and for-
warding reservation requests, distributing brochures, and
answering inquiries. Defendant maintained three em-
ployees in its New York office, kept an inactive bank ac-
count and advertised itself as defendant's New York reser-
vation office. Plaintiff instituted a slander suit against de-
fendant with service on this New York "office." The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit set aside the service on
the ground that defendant was not doing business in New
York. The court distinguished the instant case from those
cases where "traveling salesmen take orders for interstate
delivery and use office space in other states as headquarters
for their operations" [834]. The court laid emphasis on
the nature of defendant's business and refused " 'to impute
the idea of locality to a corporation, except by virtue of
those acts which realize its purposes'" [834]. Here all the
facilities of the defendant were confined to the Miami
Beach area. As the court pointed out, none had been or
could be brought to New York State by out-of-state
delivery.
For cases in this area see Wiederhorn v. The Sands, Inc.,
142 F. Supp. 448 (S.D. N.Y. 1956), and Miller v. Surf Prop-
erties, Inc., 4 N.Y. 2d 475, 176 N.Y.S. 2d 318, 151 N.E. 2d
874 (1958). There are no Maryland cases directly in point.
Note 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 88 for a list of activities
not considered as intrastate business of a corporation. Also
see 1 Md. L. Rev. 165 (1936) and 3 Md. L. Rev. 35 (1938),
and distinguish cases when jurisdiction rests on doing of a
single act and is limited to causes of action related thereto,
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McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
Cf: Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fiber Mills, 239 F. 2d 502 (4th
Cir. 1956); 17 Md. L. Rev. 140 (1957).
Evidence - Fingerprints Taken During Illegal Arrest.
Bynum v. United States, 262 F. 2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1959). De-
fendant was arrested when he came voluntarily to a police
station to inquire about his brother who was being detained
at the station. Defendant was arrested without a warrant
and without, as the Court of Appeals later found, any prob-
able cause for believing that he had committed a felony.
Defendant's fingerprints were taken during the booking
procedure at the police station. Subsequent to this defen-
dant was indicted and tried for robbery at which trial the
fingerprints thus taken were used against him.
The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and held
that under the Fourth Amendment fingerprints taken dur-
ing an illegal arrest were inadmissible in evidence against
the defendant. The Court based its decision on those cases
which have held that an article taken from one's person
during an illegal arrest is not admissible in evidence against
him. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); Bolt v.
United States, 2 F. 2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1924); and also upon
those cases which have held inadmissible statements ob-
tained from an accused during an illegal detention. Upshaw
v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948). The fact that accused's
fingerprints were available from F.B.I. files or even could
have been taken during the trial did not affect the admissi-
bility of those taken illegally.
In Maryland the use of illegally obtained evidence is
permitted where the offense charged is the commission of
a felony. However, the Bouse Act, 4 MD. CODE (1957)
Article 35, Section 5 prohibits the use of evidence pro-
cured through an illegal search in the trial of most mis-
demeanors.
In Freedman v. State, 195 Md. 275, 73 A. 2d 476 (1950)
where an arrest and search without warrant was made,
the evidence was held to be admissible on the ground that
the officers had reasonable grounds to believe that the ac-
cused had been engaged in the commission of a felony.
See 16 Md. L. Rev. 240 (1956) and 2 Md. L. Rev. 147 (1938).
Evidence - Wife's Compellability To Testify Against
Husband. Wyatt v. United States, 263 F. 2d 304 (5th Cir.
1959). Defendant husband was convicted under the Mann
1959]
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Act, 18 U.S.C.A. (1951) § 2421 of knowingly transporting a
woman (whom he later married) in interstate commerce
for the purpose of prostitution. At the trial, the woman the
defendant was accused of transporting, claimed as his wife
the privilege not to testify against him. The lower court
refused to recognize the privilege and defendant's wife was
compelled to testify against him.
The Court of Appeals held the lower court's refusal to
recognize any privilege on the part of the wife not to tes-
tify against her husband was justified under the circum-
stances since no such privilege exists in cases where the
husband has been charged with committing an offense
against the person of his wife. The Court pointed out that
this exception to the rule that a wife cannot be forced to
testify against her husband, has existed since at least 1631
when it was recognized in Lord Audley's Trial, 3 How. St.
Tr. 401 (1631). The Court further distinguished the recent
Supreme Court case of Hawkins v. United States, 79 S. Ct.
136 (1958) by noting that in the Hawkins case the wife
was not the victim of the husband's actions as she was in
the present case.
See 15 Md. L. Rev. 16 (1955) for discussion of Maryland
cases in this area.
Insurance - Double Recovery. Kopp v. Home Mutual
Insurance Co., 6 Wis. 2d 53, 94 N.W. 2d 224 (1959). Plaintiff-
insured took out accident insurance with medical payment
coverage with defendant, and was also a member of the
Blue Cross Hospital Benefit Plan. After sustaining acci-
dental injuries and incurring hospitalization expenses
which were paid by Blue Cross, plaintiff submitted a claim
for such hospital expenses to defendant. Defendant re-
fused to pay, not because the plaintiff would be recover-
ing twice for the same expense, but on the ground that
plaintiff never actually incurred any hospital expense,
since under the Blue Cross plan an affiliated hospital is
obligated to furnish a member with hospitalization serv-
ices and then look to Blue Cross for reimbursement. The ap-
pellate court in allowing the claim concluded that since
insured's policy with defendant did not state "who" was
to incur the expense in order for plaintiff to be able to
recover, the defendant was under a contractual duty to
pay for medical and hospital services supplied to the plain-
tiff whether or not he suffered financial loss. The Court
considered the lack of specific designation an ambiguity
and construed it against the insurer.
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Price Discrimination - Consignment Sales. Ludwig v'.
American Greetings Corp., 264 F. 2d 286 (6th Cir. 1959).
Defendant-manufacturer of greeting cards was charged
with violating Section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act,
15 U.S.C.A. (1951) § 13(b) by allegedly injuring the busi-
ness of a competing wholesaler through the placing of such
wholesaler's former retail customers on a consignment
basis for the purpose of inducing them to transfer their
business to defendant. In reversing the District Court, the
Court of Appeals held that the acts alleged constituted a
prima facie case of indirect price discrimination under
Section 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. The Court also
ruled that although the plaintiff might have a cause of
action for unfair competition, this type of remedy was
not an exclusive one but was one concurrent with plain-
tiff's cause of action under the Robinson-Patman Act. In
so holding, the Court upheld the right of a competitor to
bring such action, as well as a customer who has been
discriminated against.
See Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 118
(1954), Mandeville Farms v. Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236
(1948), Central Ice Cream Co. v. Golden Rod Ice Cream
Co., 257 F. 2d 417, 418 (7th Cir. 1958), Fitch v. Kentucky-
Tennessee Light & Power Co., 136 F. 2d 12, 149 A.L.R. 650
(6th Cir. 1943).
Social Security - Termination Of Old Age Benefits.
Nestor v. Folsom, 169 F. Supp. 922 (D.C. D.C. 1959). Plain-
tiff alien, who was engaged in employment covered by the
Social Security Act from 1936 to 1955, applied and received
an award of old age benefits of $55.60 per month effective
November, 1955. In July, 1956 plaintiff was deported to
Bulgaria pursuant to provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, Section 241 (a) (1), 8 U.S.C.A. (1953)
§ 1251 a (1) and the Bureau of Old Age and Survivors
Insurance of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare was notified by the Attorney General of the United
States of plaintiff's deportation. The Bureau immediately
suspended the payment of old age benefits to plaintiff pur-
suant to Section 202 (n) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C.A. (1957) § 402 (n), which authorizes the "termina-
tion of benefits upon the deportation of the primary bene-
ficiary." Upon a petition to the District Court for statu-
tory review, the Court held Section 202 (n) of the Social
Security Act unconstitutional as a denial of due process
1959]
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of law under the fifth amendment. The Court concluded
that the basic nature of old age benefits render them prop-
erty rights which once accrued cannot be taken away with-
out due process of law. The Court relied heavily upon
Steinberg v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 590, 596 (Ct. Cl.
1958) where it was stated:
"If I am correct in saying that the retired pay is
not a pension or a gratuity, but is compensation for
services already rendered, then I think an employee's
right to this retired pay does become vested at the
time of retirement."
If this view is correct, Congress has taken this vested right
without due process of law."
A statement in Ewing v. Gardner, 185 F. 2d 781, 784
(6th Cir. 1950) was also relied upon: "The right of the
wage earner to the primary benefit is not a gratuity, but
is a property right which can be enforced by court action."
For a holding that Social Security benefits do not con-
stitute property rights see Roston v. Folsom, 158 F. Supp.
112, 120 (E.D. N.Y. 1957) which decision the present court
recognized to be in conflict with its holding.
An appeal is pending in the principal case.
Taxation - Involuntary Conversion. Steuart Brothers
v. Commissioner of Internal Rev., 261 F. 2d 580 (4th Cir.
1958). Taxpayer-plaintiff brought suit seeking to avail it-
self of the non-recognition of gain benefits resulting from
an involuntary conversion into similar property provided
for under I.R.C. 1939, Section 112 (f), 26 U.S.C.A. (1955)
§ 112. Taxpayer, who had been in the real estate invest-
ment business in Washington, D. C. for a number of years,
purchased certain land in Washington for investment pur-
poses. Shortly after acquiring this land plaintiff bound
itself contractually to build two buildings to be leased, one
as a grocery store and one as a warehouse. Subsequent
to this undertaking but before any buildings were con-
structed, the land on which the buildings were to be built
was condemned and taxpayer received a condemnation
award of $425,000. This sum represented a gain of
$349,058.54 to plaintiff. With the proceeds of the award
plaintiff purchased other real estate for investment. The
new properties were primarily utilized for usages of the
automobile business, i.e., an automobile showroom, a re-
pair shop, a garage service station, a service station for
cabs, and a parking lot for an automobile dealer.
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The Tax Court in disallowing the non-recognition of
gain decided that taxpayer had not converted this gain
into property which was similar or related in use to the
property converted. The Court of Appeals reversed hold-
ing that the taxpayer was entitled to the non-recognition
of gains benefit since "the original real estate was held by
it for investment purposes and the proceeds of the con-
demnation were reinvested in real estate of the same gen-
eral class" [5841. The Court distinguished the present case
from other decisions which held subsequent uses of prop-
erty to be dissimilar by noting that in the present case
the taxpayer itself was not in possession and did not itself
use the new properties for any purpose. Instead taxpayer
simply held the newly acquired properties for investment
purposes which was exactly the use it made of the con-
demned properties. The current version of the 1954 CoDE
(§ 1033 (g)) added by the Technical Amendments Act of
1958 clearly requires the same result that the Court reached
here through liberal judicial construction of the 1939 Code.
Taxation - Payments To Widow. Bounds v. United
States, 262 F. 2d 876 (4th Cir. 1958). Plaintiff-taxpayer,
widow of a corporation president, brought an action to
recover income taxes paid by her. Plaintiff received in
1952, $20,000 from her deceased husband's corporation,
"as recognition in part of the great contribution made by
George C. Bounds,. . . and, as additional compensation for
services rendered to the Corporation by George C. Bounds
during his lifetime ...... This payment was listed on the
corporation's books as compensation to an officer's widow
and as a business expense on its tax return. Despite the
board of Directors' labeling of the payment as "additional
compensation" and despite the corporation's treatment of
the payment as a business expense, the Court of Appeals
in. reversing the District Court held such payment con-
stituted a non-taxable gift to the taxpayer.
The Court of Appeals noted that of the two separate
payments of benefits which were made at plaintiff's hus-
band's death, $5,000 accrued salary was made to the hus-
band's estate whereas the $20,000 payment was made di-
rectly to the widow. The Court also pointed out the ab-
sence of any long-range payment plan, the presence of




Recognizing the trend of judicial decisions holding
similar payments to be gifts, the Commissioner in an In-
formation Release on August 25, 1958 announced that the
Internal Revenue Service would not litigate under the
1939 Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. § 22, "cases in-
volving the taxability of voluntary payments to widows
by their deceased husbands' employers 'unless there is
clear evidence that they were intended as compensation
for services, or where the payments may be considered
as dividends.'" The government announced in oral argu-
ment in the present case that this action was being pressed
in spite of the announced policy of the Commissioner be-
cause this litigation was commenced prior to August, 1958,
the date of the information release [8341. The Court ques-
tioned both the logic and justice of the Government's at-
tempt to exclude this taxpayer from the benefit of the
Government's new policy.
The Court indicated that cases of this character that
arise under the 1954 Code will be affected by the new word-
ing in Section 101 (b).
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